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The situation in Dagestan over the last few years has been characterized by stagnation, 
apathy and continuous crisis. The statistics that describe the quality of life in Dagestan 
draw a fairly dismal picture even in comparison to other parts of the Russian Federation. 
According to many economic and social indicators, the republic occupies the last place 
among the subjects of the Russian Federation. Rich in natural and labor resources, it 
nevertheless derives 90 percent of its budget from Moscow's subsidies. The average 
income in Dagestan is one-third of the Russian average. In the number of crimes 
committed, however, Dagestan ranks first among federation subjects. 
Out of more than 800,000 persons who are economically active, one in five is 
unemployed. Moreover, 40 percent of Dagestan's 2 million inhabitants live in villages 
where, especially in the mountainous areas, traditional agricultural methods are still 
employed. Consequently, a substantial proportion of the population is employed only in 
seasonal agricultural work, which further raises the total number of unemployed. For 
nearly a century, large-scale seasonal migrations of workers to other regions mitigated 
this problem. Even 10 to 15 years ago, from March to November, about 300,000 
Dagestani men would form brigades and travel to different parts of the Soviet Union. In 
this regard, Dagestan may have suffered more as a result of the collapse of the USSR 
than other parts of the former Soviet Union. 
Dagestan has about 2 million inhabitants and 700,000 Dagestanis are living outside its 
borders. Currently, due in no small part to discrimination against "persons of Caucasian 
1
nationality" (Moscow's mayor, for instance, has ousted such persons repeatedly), 
unemployed Dagestanis are constrained to remain in their own republic. Other southern 
regions of Russia also experience the economic hardships resulting from that 
discrimination. Not only in Dagestan, but also in Kalmikiya, Stavropol krai, as well as the 
Volgograd and Rostov oblasts, the shepherds tended to be Dagestanis. Now, because 
of a rise in crime and tensions among nationalities, many Dagestanis do not risk 
remaining in those regions and have returned to Dagestan.
Economic dislocation does not always result in a similar degradation in public morals. 
Unfortunately, the fine traditions of the mountaineers have eroded quickly. The 
traditional values of the mountaineers--love of freedom, honor, dignity, bravery, 
hospitality, respect for elders--have proven defenseless against the tide of criminality 
and immorality. The "new Dagestanis"--partly European, partly Caucasian--are 
characterized by their luxurious homes, Mercedes, Jeeps, armed guards and social 
clubs (frequently offshoots of criminal groups). The signs of conspicuous consumption 
constitute the most sought-after goals for the younger generation and an impossible 
dream for older persons, most of whom are occupied with the challenges of survival.
To the embarrassment of Dagestani men, the material well-being of the family has come 
to rest primarily on the women, particularly in the mountains. Eighty-five percent of the 
consumer goods sold on the Dagestani market is comprised of imports from Turkey, the 
United Arab Emirates, Iran, the Czech Republic, and Poland. Despite Islamic tradition, 
the women form the majority of the so-called "shop-tourists" who import goods from 
these countries. The majority of the merchants at various markets and bazaars in the 
region are also women. 
Political Turmoil
The former chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov, commented on the 
eve of the war in Chechnya that "every Chechen is his own president." That is an 
overstatement in the Chechen case and is patently false when applied to Dagestanis, 
who accept the existence of authority, concentrated in the government's leader; they 
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also expect that ruler to govern cruelly. Given the historical tradition of creating cults of 
personalities and the Soviet obsession with leaders, which have continued to be 
realized in many former Soviet states, it would hardly be surprising if Dagestan created 
its own "father of the nation." 
The entrenched political leadership consists of the chairman of the State Council, 
Magomedali Magomedov; the chairman of the government, Hizri Shikhsiadov; the 
chairman of the People's Assembly, Muhu Aliev; the former vice premier of the 
government and now mayor of the capital, Makhachkala, Said Amirov; the leader of the 
Avar People's Front (Imam Shamil), head of the joint-stock company Dagneft and vice 
premier of the government of Dagestan, Gadzhi Makhachev; the leader of the Lak 
People's Movement (Kazi Kumukh), Magomed Khachilaev; and the chairman of the 
Union of Muslims of Russia, Nadirshakh Khachilaev. (The vice premier of the Russian 
Federation, Ramazan Abdulatipov, a potential competitor to Magomedov, recently stated 
that he would not want to lead the Dagestani State Council unless its chairman was 
elected by popular vote.) 
The People's Assembly of 19 March 1998 decided to repeal Article 93 of the republic's 
constitution, which had prohibited persons of the same nationality from occupying the 
position of State Council chairman for two consecutive terms. This move primarily 
benefits Magomedali Magomedov, allowing him to put forward his candidacy for another 
term. It is virtually assured that he will be able to convince the Constitutional Assembly, 
scheduled to convene in June, to allow him to remain in power for another four years.
The preliminary work to ensure this outcome is nearing completion. The constitution 
was adopted in 1994 amid high tensions among the nationalities. It provided for a 
governing council elected for two years. Article 93 was meant to ensure that the 
presidency of the republic would rotate among the different nationalities of Dagestan. 
However, in 1996, when the terms of the governing council and its chairman were due 
to expire, the Constitutional Assembly extended their appointments for an additional two 
years. This action was explained in reference to the difficult sociopolitical situation in 
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Dagestan, which was created by the economic, transport and information blockade 
imposed on the republic in connection with the war in Chechnya; two years was 
believed to be an insufficient amount of time to accomplish any substantial 
improvements.
The additional two-year term granted to the governing council and its chairman is due to 
expire in June 1998. Life for most Dagestanis has not improved. The budget of the 
republic remains heavily subsidized. Living standards have fallen to a critical low, where 
one-third of the population lives below the poverty level. Corruption has reached new 
heights, extending even into such areas as higher education, while crimes committed in 
the republic have given Dagestan international notoriety for terrorist acts, bombings, 
political and business-linked assassinations, and kidnappings. The population lives in 
persistent fear of crime, new terrorist attacks and the possibility of a Russian offensive 
of the sort staged in neighboring Chechnya.
In view of this social context, the lack of public protest in response to the action of the 
People's Assembly is hardly surprising. The deputies who initiated the action collected 
the requisite number of their colleagues' signatures even before the 19 March session. 
Most of the population was engaged in the difficult business of making a living, others 
were busy organizing pilgrimages to Mecca, and the remainder paid some attention to 
the political developments at the center. Hardly anyone seemed concerned with the 
regional political scene.
Although a vocal opposition to secular government in Central Asia, little reaction to the 
assembly action was heard in Dagestan from the Wahhabis, who have gone 
underground. While they constitute a mainstream movement in other parts of the 
Muslim world (e.g., in Saudi Arabia), the Wahhabis are considered a radical Islamic sect 
in Dagestan. The Wahhabis were outlawed as religious extremists earlier this year after 
a group of them attacked a Russian base in Dagestan in December 1997. The 
representatives of Dagestan's official Sunni faith welcomed the parliament's action on 
that occasion and have also failed to protest the revision of the constitution.
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While some criticism appeared in the media, the articles failed to resonate with the 
public. The Avar paper Khakikat compared the Dagestani constitution to a sword in its 2 
April 1998 (No. 62) issue. Nurul Islam--a publication of the All-Russian Muslim Social 
Movement (Nur)--wrote that the "Constitution is not a sacred text like the Koran, one 
can rewrite it to suit himself."
The Committee to Protect the Constitution of the Patriotic Forces of Dagestan held a 
rather hysterical rally in Makhachkala on 18 March 1998, and called on the current 
leadership to resign when its term expires in June. The committee declared that the 
"illegal" assembly decision was "presented to the people of Dagestan as a means of 
preserving stability under the 'wise leadership of the irreplaceable Magomedali 
Magomedov' who has already been at the pinnacle of power in the republic for the last 
eight years, and prior to that, for at least ten years held the leadership position in the 
ruling party-nomenklatura elite. The results of his 'wise policies' are well known: 
Dagestan continues to be last in socioeconomic development." (1)
The committee suggested that Dagestanis should "eliminate the Constitutional 
Assembly and elect the chairman of the State Council by popular vote and the members 
of the State Council by the particular nationalities throughout the republic." It concluded 
with the finding that "in view of Dagestan's multinational population it is best governed 
by a parliamentary system." The committee published an appeal to President Boris 
Yel'tsin which noted that "Dagestan is going through another explosive period" and 
"requires renewal, a reassessment of its values and a chance to catch its breath." (2) 
Needless to say, no renewal, reassessment or "chance to catch its breath" was 
forthcoming: There was no official reaction from the Kremlin.
As a very influential Dagestani politician, the mayor of Makhachkala, Said Amirov, told 
Dagestan's Youth, "Magomedali Magomedov's considerable experience, his personal 
and professional characteristics, his connections with the center, and Boris Yel'tsin's 
favorable attitude all played a part. In addition, we, the law-abiding citizens must respect 
the decisions of the elected representatives. I do not think that if M. Magomedov puts 
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forward his candidacy for a second term (sic), that anyone will be able to compete with 
him." (3)
The State Council was intended to serve as a "collective presidency," tailored for the 
peculiar conditions of Dagestan. In particular, it is meant to prevent any one nationality 
from dominating the politics of the republic. In view of recent events, however, the State 
Council has been aptly compared to the obkom of the CPSU. 
The State Council and its chairman have unique capabilities for political maneuver in 
the republic because they are elected not by a national vote but by the Constitutional 
Assembly. The latter consists of 120 deputies from within the People's Assembly and 
120 deputies from the rayon administrations, many of them heads of cities or rayon 
administrations, who are subordinate to the State Council and its chairman. 
Whenever official personalities emphasize the multinational character of Dagestan, they  
refer to the 32 "indigenous" (korennyh) nationalities. The State Council consists of one 
representative from each of the "constitutional" or "main" nationalities (narod): Avars, 
Aguls, Azeris, Chechens, Dargins, Kumyks, Laks, Lezgins, Mountain Jews (Tats), 
Nogai, Russians, Rutuls, Tabarasans, Tsakhurs. Other nationalities, such as: Andiis, 
Archins, Akhvakhts, Bagulals, Bezhtins, Botlikhs, Ginukhs, Godoberins, Gunzibs, Didoi, 
Karatins, Tindals, Chamalals, and Khvarshin, are counted as Avars. Kubachins and 
Kaitags are considered Dargin. (4) The size of these groups ranges from 1,000 persons 
(Archins) to 50,000 (Andiis). According to the constitution they are not represented on 
the State Council.
"Won't you agree that to prohibit a person from occupying a position on the basis of his 
nationality is unfair, undemocratic, not to speak of the fact that it constitutes a most 
brutal offense against human rights?" Said Amirov asked in the Dagestan's Youth 
interview in defense of the assembly action. Surely that sentiment ought to apply to the 
above-mentioned members of "non-constitutional" or "non-basic" nationalities and not 
only to the personalities who have been in power for over a decade.
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The People's Assembly consists of 120 deputies; almost every third person has a 
criminal past. A little over one-quarter of the deputies were apparatchiki or nomenklatura 
workers in the Soviet times. If classified according to current occupation, the deputies 
include 42 merchants or directors of collective farms; 11 bankers; 10 directors of 
ministries or departments; and 24 directors of city or rayon administrations. Clearly a 
substantial number of the deputies hold positions in which they are directly or indirectly 
subordinate to the State Council. Many of them have for one reason or another 
petitioned the State Council chairman and have received his support. For this reason 
the real powers of the State Council chairman are by far greater than his powers under 
the constitution.
In Dagestan the reality of government does not correspond to the socioethnic makeup 
of the population. In countries with long democratic traditions, the question of ethnicity 
can be left to the private, non-governmental sphere. In Dagestan--which has spent 140 
years in Russia's sphere of influence--laws, including constitutions, continue to seem 
artificial or foreign. The electoral system, the government, the judicial system and other 
state institutions were formed without due consideration of the potentially destructive 
influences of the clan system and ethnocentrism. At the same time, the political 
orientation of the Dagestanis is not defined by membership in party and social 
organizations. The degree of Dagestan's sovereignty vis-a-vis the center remains 
unclear. Similarly it remains to be seen if the republic will become a parliamentary or 
presidential republic. The daily questions of survival in Dagestan are by far more acute 
than these questions of political theory. If the Dagestanis were able to adapt (and 
corrupt) the Communist regime to local circumstances, they can surely use the 
democratic methods of the 1994 Constitution to realize clan and nationality interests. 
NOTES:
1 Program read at rally held in Lenin Square, Makhachkala, 18 February 1998, by the 
Committee to Protect the Constitution of the Patriotic Forces of Dagestan.
2 Ibid.
3 Dagestan's Youth, 27 March 1998, No. 12.
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4 The groups listed above add up to 30 not 32 because the ethnic group Terekments, 
who are of part-Turkmen and part-Azeri derivation, speak a dialect of the Azeri language 
and assimilate into the Azeri population, are mistakenly represented as a separate 
ethnos. Moreover, a single North Caucasian people with one language, Tatskyi, derived 
from northern Persia, and one religion, Judaism, are sometimes called Tats and other 
times called Mountain Jews. Many persons who are not aware of this fact believe that 
the Tats and the Mountain Jews constitute separate nationalities. This is akin to listing 
Magyars and Hungarians as separate people.
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